Philosophy of Language: Truth, Denotation, Extensions

My take on truth is that it is "defined" via simple rules of inter-substitution, much like deflationists have (in effect) long said. The truth-theoretic (similarly denotation-, naive extensions-theoretic) paradoxes teach us not that truth (etc) is more complicated than the naive appearances reflect; they teach us that negation lives a sort of double-life. In as much as falsity is defined in terms of truth and negation, falsity likewise lives a double-life. Like Tarski and, more recently (and explicitly), Graham Priest have said, English is inconsistent; however, the inconsistency reflects only one of two aspects of negation; it reflects negation when it is on holiday. The details of these ideas are worked out in various papers and a larger book project. I will (soon) post some of that material for downloading purposes.

Philosophy of Logic: Pluralism

My current take on logic is finding expression as logical pluralism, a topic on which I'm writing a book with Greg Restall. We think that there is more than one consequence relation in (or under-writing) English, including at least a classical one and a paraconsistent one. Our book (approaching completion) lays out pluralism, as we conceive it.

Textbook with Bas van Fraassen: Possibilities and Paradox

If you are looking for the textbook's (incipient) website, please follow Possibilities and Paradox. (Eventually, I will have the website on the UConn server, but for now it remains only at van Fraassen's Princeton server.)

God sets us nothing but riddles. Here the boundaries meet and all contradictions exist side by side.
(Dostoevski)