Professor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy, U-1054
University of Connecticut
Storrs, CT 06269-1054
Office: 202 Manchester Hall
Phone: (860) 486-4592
ruth.millikan@uconn.edu
Research Interests:
Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Biology, Ontology, and Natural Epistemology
My research interests span many topics in the philosophy of biology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and ontology. The unity is in method rather than subject matter. The aspects of these fields that interest me are continuous with relevant scientific work and with the philosophy of science. I have been especially interested in applications of evolutionary theory in these areas, and in the ontology that makes study of biological entities possible.
For a complete listing of articles and books, please see my curriculum vitae.
| Online Papers: |
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| Places of publication are in my curriculum vitae above. To view the following “pdf” files you need to obtain a free Adobe Acrobat Reader. |
| Forthcoming |
Thoughts of Real Kinds |
| 2013 |
An Epistemology for Phenomenology |
| 2012 |
What’s Inside a Thinking Animal? |
| 2012 |
Spracherwerb Learning Language |
| 2012 |
On Meaning, Meaning and Meaning |
| 2012 |
Are There Mental Indexicals and Demonstratives? |
| 2012 |
Accidents (APA John Dewey Lecture) |
| 2011 |
Loosing the Word-Concept Tie |
| 2010 |
On Knowing the Meaning; With a Coda on Swampman |
| 2009 |
Embedded Rationality |
| 2008 |
A Difference of Some Consequence Between Conventions And Rules |
| 2008 |
Biosemantics (for the Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind, Brian McLaughlin, Editor) |
| 2007 |
An Input Condition for Teleosemantics |
| 2006 |
Useless Content |
| 2006 |
Styles of Rationality |
| 2005 |
The Father, The Son and the Daughter: Sellars, Brandom and Millikan |
| 2005 |
Some Reflections on the TT – ST Debate |
| 2004 |
Existence Proof for a Viable Externalism |
| 2004 |
On Reading Signs: Some Differences Between Us and The Others |
| 2003 |
In Defense of Public Language |
| 2003 |
Teleological Theories of Mental Content |
| 2002 |
Biofunctions: Two Paradigms |
| 2001 |
The Language-Thought Partnership A Bird’s Eye View |
| 2001 |
The Myth of Mental Indexicals |
| 2001 |
What Has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation? |
| 2001 |
Cutting Philosophy of Language Down to Size |
| 2001 |
Purposes and cross-purposes: On the Evolution of Languages and Language |
| 2000 |
Reading Mother Nature’s Mind |
| 1999 |
Wings, Spoons, Pills, and Quills: A Pluralist Theory of Function |
| 1999 |
Historical Kinds and the Special Sciences |
| 1999 |
Reply to Boyd on Historical Kinds and the Special Sciences |
| 1998 |
A Common Structure for Concepts of Individuals, Stuffs and Real Kinds |
| 1998 |
With Enemies Like These, I Don’t Need Friends: Words, Concepts, and Entities |
| 1998 |
Language Conventions Made Simple |
| 1998 |
How We Make Our Ideas Clear: Empiricist Epistemology for Empirical Concepts |
| 1998 |
Naturalizing Intentionality (World Congress XX) |
| 1998 |
A More Plausible Kind of Recognitional Concept |
| 1998 |
On Cognitive Luck: Externalism in an Evolutionary Frame |
| 1996 |
On Swampkinds |
| 1996 |
Pushmi-Pullyu Representations
 |
| 1993 |
White Queen Psychology, Chapter 7: What Is Behavior? A Philosophical Essay on Ethology and Individualism in Psychology Part One |
| 1993 |
White Queen Psychology, Chapter 8: The Green Grass Growing All Around A Philosophical Essay on Ethology and Individualism in Psychology, Part Two |
Professor of Philosophy