Upcoming Events
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4/16
Annual Logic Lecture
Algebraic Constructions In Models Of Peano Arithmetic And Its Weak Fragments
Paola D’Aquino (Università della Campania)Annual Logic Lecture
Algebraic Constructions In Models Of Peano Arithmetic And Its Weak Fragments
Paola D’Aquino (Università della Campania)Friday, April 16th, 2021
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM
Storrs Campus Zoom
Professor D’Aquino is the UConn Logic Groups 2020/2021 Scholar of Consequence, and will deliver the Annual Logic Lecture.
Abstract: I will concentrate on the ideal theory of models of Peano Arithmetic and some of its weak fragments. I will present a model theoretic analysis of the residue rings of these structures. -
4/21
Philosophy Brown Bag: Llanera
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4/23
Logic Colloquium
Bilateralist Truth-Maker Semantics for ST, TS, LP, K3, ...
Ulf Hlobil (Concordia University)Logic Colloquium
Bilateralist Truth-Maker Semantics for ST, TS, LP, K3, ...
Ulf Hlobil (Concordia University)Friday, April 23rd, 2021
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM
Storrs Campus Zoom
Bilateralist Truth-Maker Semantics for ST, TS, LP, K3, ...
Ulf Hlobil, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada
Abstract:
The talk advocates a marriage of inferentialist bilateralism and truth-maker bilateralism. Inferentialist bilateralists like Restall and Ripley say that a collection of sentences, Y, follows from a collection of sentences, X, iff it is incoherent (or out-of-bounds) to assert all the sentences in X and, at the same time, deny all the sentences in Y. In Fine’s truth-maker theory, we have a partially ordered set of states that exactly verify and falsify sentences, and some of these states are impossible. We can think of making-true as the worldly analogue of asserting, of making-false as the worldly analogue of denying, and of impossibility as the worldly analogue of incoherence. This suggests that we may say that, in truth-maker theory, a collection of sentences, Y, follows (logically) from a collection of sentences, X, iff (in all models) any fusion of exact verifiers of the members of X and exact falsifiers of the member of Y is impossible. Under routine assumptions about truth-making, this yields classical logic. Relaxing one such assumption yields the non-transitive logic ST. Relaxing another assumption yields the non-reflexive logic TS. We can use known facts about the relation between ST, LP, and K3, to provide an interpretation of LP as the logic of falsifiers and K3 as the logic of verifiers. The resulting semantics for ST is more flexible than its usual three-valued semantics because it allows us, e.g., to reject monotonicity. We can also recover fine-grained logics, like Correia’s logic of factual equivalence.
All welcome!
Please contact us for the Zoom log-in information. -
4/23
ECOM Speaker Series: Emeritus Professor Peter Gardenfors
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4/26
VICTR Presents: Eduardo Barrio
VICTR Presents: Eduardo Barrio
Monday, April 26th, 2021
10:00 AM - 12:00 PM
Other online
The Virtual International Consortium for Truth Research (VICTR) will have a talk by Eduardo Barrio (University of Buenos Aires), on “Anti-exceptionalism, Truth, and the BA-Plan” on April 26, 10:00am EDT / 14:00 UTC.
Abstract: Anti-exceptionalism about logic states that logical theories have no special epistemological status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti-exceptionalists include data about semantic paradoxes as a part of the logical evidence. Exploring the Buenos Aires Plan, the recent development of the metainferential hierarchy of ST-logics shows that there are multiple options to deal with such paradoxes. There is a whole ST-based hierarchy, of which LP and ST themselves are only the first steps. The logics in this hierarchy are also options to analyze the inferential patterns allowed in a language that contains its own truth predicate. This talk explores these responses analyzing some reasons to go beyond the first steps. I will show that LP, ST, and the logics of the ST-hierarchy offer different diagnoses for the same evidence: the inferences and metainferences the agents endorse in the presence of the truth-predicate. But even if the data are not enough to adopt one of these logics, there are other elements to evaluate the revision of classical logic. How close should we be to classical logic? Which logic should be used during the revision? Should a logic be closed under its own rules? How could a logic obey the validities it contains? And mainly, which is the best explanation for the logical principles to deal with semantic paradoxes? I will argue that, if the answers to these questions are provided from an anti-exceptionalist perspective, ST-metainferential logics in general are the best available options.
You can register for this event at this link: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZIocu-prj4iGdY0NwHUWjPYWLvywnGfLeku
VICTR is sponsored by the Future of Truth Project at the University of Connecticut Humanities Institute, the University of Alabama, and the University of Waikato -
4/28
Philosophy Brown Bag: Culbertson
